Japan has once again imposed its on-again off-again ban on U.S. beef. This drama, which involves more than just meat, begins in 2003 with the discovery of a mad cow in Washington State.

Background

In recent months, the U.S. has applied increasing pressure on Japan to lift the two-year ban on U.S. and Canadian beef imports, which the country and 40 others imposed after a U.S. Holstein cow tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (“BSE” or “Mad Cow”). In the year prior to the ban, Japan was the largest foreign market for American beef, estimated at roughly $1.5 billion (“Canadian Business and Current Affairs”, Canadian Press NewsWire, 24 August 2005).

By October 2005, U.S. Congress was losing patience and threatened to impose trade sanctions against the Japanese. Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki assured U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow in October that the Japanese panel debate over the matter was nearly at the end to hold off any U.S. retaliation (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 10 October 2005).

U.S. President George W. Bush met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in early November 2005. The President’s statement, bullish on beef, was a response to the political pressures exerted by U.S. Congress:

"The prime minister and his government (have) taken a study on the issue and it's confirmed that US beef would be safe and I appreciate that we are progressing on this issue," the president said. (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 10 October 2005).

Compare this with Koizumi’s tight-lipped response:

For his part, Koizumi mentioned only that he discussed the beef issue with Bush. (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 10 October 2005).

Japanese skittishness on the matter may be a result of countervailing pressures in the form of perceived public health concerns. Japanese news agency Kyodo conducted a survey in November that showed roughly 70 percent of Japanese consumers opposed lifting the ban on U.S. beef (Toronto Star Guelph Mercury, 5 November 2005) and that 75 percent would not eat American beef if it were available (New York Times, 7 January 2006).

In spite of these fears, the Japanese government lifted the ban on 12 December. The terms were that all imported beef must come from cows slaughtered at the age of 20 months or younger. Also, brains and spinal cord material, parts that potentially carry prions, must be removed (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 12 December 2005). Prions are irregular proteins which are the point of transmission of BSE.

Japan’s decision was good news for the U.S. meat industry, not only for the $1.5 billion market in Japan, but for the anticipated ripple effect. Forty other countries imposed an embargo after 2003 cutting U.S. beef exports by 64 percent—an estimated $3.8 billion (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 January 2006). Following Japan’s resumption of U.S. and Canadian beef imports, several countries followed suit: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Thailand.

The Deal Breaker

A slip-up by New York meat processing firm undid months of delicate negotiations and ended the provisional resumption of trade. Japanese inspectors found backbones in three of a 41-box shipment of veal sent by the Atlantic Veal & Lamb Inc. The backbone contains spinal materials, violating the terms of trade (Windsor Star (Ontario) 21 January 2006).

This occurrence, so soon after the lifting the ban, is not only an embarrassment to U.S. beef producers, who have been bending over backwards for months to attain Japanese trust. This is also a scandal in Japan, bolstering popular perception that the Koizumi caved to U.S. commercial interest at the expense of Japanese health concerns. Under attack by political opponents, the prime minister responded: “We decided to resume imports after scientific discussions by the Food Safety Committee and a report which took into consideration of people's opinions. The decision was not made because we put priority on the Japan-U.S. relations.” (Associated Press, 21 January 2006 ).

The U.S. responses by the Secretary of Agriculture:

"Our agreement with Japan is to export beef with no vertebral column and we have failed to meet the terms of that agreement," said Mike Johanns. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 January 2006 )

and by the President of Atlantic Veal & Lamb:

"We sincerely regret that we shipped product not approved for export to Japan. Our company shipped this product in response to an order by a Japanese customer," said Philip Peerless. (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 20 January 2006).

all admitted responsibility for violating the terms of the agreement. However, apologies were tempered by a distinct defensiveness over the quality and safety of the beef. U.S. officials and beef processors denied that the food-safety procedures in the U.S. were rough, as suggested by the Democratic Party of Japan (Jiji Press Ticker Service, 3, February 2006). Regarding the tainted bone-in shipment of veal, Peerless added:

"The product we shipped is safe and is widely consumed in the US marketplace. Were this product shipped to San Francisco, there would be no question about its safety," said Peerless. (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 20 January 2006)

Breaching the terms of a delicate agreement is a serious matter. But, it was an honest mistake, at least, from the American meatpacking perspective. Further, a few shards of bone does not necessarily render all U.S. beef suspect. U.S. Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services Undersecretary J.B. Penn claimed that the risk of contracting BSE through American beef was less than that of a car accident. Japanese Deputy Cabinet Secretary Jinen Nagase responded that such a comment only points to U.S. disregard for the matter: "The US should take an appropriate measure so that we don't get the wrong impression that it's belittling the problem." (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 January 2006).

Political opportunism

Japanese lawmakers are well within rights to stipulate measures necessary to meet their standards. However, when you get past the rhetoric of political opportunism and face-saving bluster, the outrage is disproportional to the miniscule risk actually posed in this case. That is, the they're overreacting. First, there is no evidence that the spinal cord materials included in the shipment of veal came from an infected animal. Second, if the consensus is that cows under the age of 21 are not infected with BSE, then it follows that veal would also be free of the disease. Finally, since 1997, the U.S. has banned the use of bone and meal cattle feed. This means that U.S. cattle would not be cannibalizing any brain and spinal cord material thought to spread BSE. It may be that the Japanese have higher standards for their beef, but it does not mean that the U.S.D.A. standards are not effective for identifying BSE and containing the spread of the disease.

The U.S. Agriculture Department is working on methods of tracking the movement of cattle intended for export to Japan (The Associated Press, 1 February 2006 ). Some U.S. cattle producers have invested in a Quality System of Assessment (QSA) specifically to meet standards for the Japanese market. The QSA documents birth dates, tracks movement through a 15-digit identification number, and audits participants every six months. Such tracking comes at considerable expense for the cattle producers (Beef (Primedia), 1 February 2006). It is unfair to dismiss the dedication to safety demonstrated by these cattle producers based one isolated mistake.

Rationally, there must be more to the story than mad cows. U.S. cattle-producers point to protectionism. However, Japanese domestic politics may be at the root of the matter. The Democratic Party of Japan is using the beef scandal along with two unrelated issues in a three-pronged attack against the reform policies of Koizumi. In the last month of his term, Koizumi intends to incorporate widespread administrative restructuring—consolidation of financial institutions and streamlining personnel—which is binding to the next cabinet (The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 2 February 2006).

Mindy Kotler, director of the Japan Information Access Project, presents another facet regarding Japan’s stance on U.S. beef. That is, the Japanese government overcompensates for the demonstrated incompetence of the past in handling outbreaks of BSE. The botched cover-up of a mad-cow incident in 2001 led to public embarrassment of the ministry of agriculture. Because the dominant political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, is a coalition comprising strong rural constituents, the LDP keeps this in mind when it shuts out cheaper foreign beef and takes a tough stand against mad cows.